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Several attempts have been made in the economics literature to measure money 
laundering. However, the adequacy of these models is difficult to assess, as money 
laundering takes place secretly and, hence, goes unobserved. An exception is trade-
based money laundering (TBML), a special form of trade abuse that has been 
discovered only recently. TBML refers to criminal proceeds that are transferred 
around the world using fake invoices that under- or overvalue imports and exports. 
This article is a first attempt to test well-known prototype models proposed by 
Walker and Unger to predict illicit money laundering flows and to apply traditional 
gravity models borrowed from international trade theory. To do so, we use a dataset 
of Zdanowicz of TBML flows from the US to 199 countries. Our test rejects the 
specifications of the Walker and Unger prototype models, at least for TBML. The 
traditional gravity model that we present here can indeed explain TBML flows 
worldwide in a plausible manner. An important determinant is licit trade, the mass in 
which TBML is hidden. Furthermore, our results suggest that criminals use TBML in 
order to escape the stricter anti money laundering regulations of financial markets. 
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JEL classification: C21, F10. 
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Money laundering aims at disguising the illicit origin of money or other assets. The Chicago gangster 
Al Capone transformed illegal alcohol proceeds during times of the American prohibition into 
revenues from his laundry business, which gave the disguising process its name. Money laundering 
can take many forms: transferring criminal proceeds from one bank account to another repeatedly over 
the globe until its origin is untraceable, pretending to have won money through gambling, or using 
fake export and import bills to ship criminal proceeds outside or into a country.  
 
The 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001 has enforced the US’s sensitivity to illegal money flows, as 
authorities presume that such money transfers support international terrorist and criminal activities. 
Today financial transactions between the US and the rest of the world are closely monitored: banks 
have to report suspicious transactions and have to fulfill customer due diligence rules. However, 
Unger and den Hertog (2011) claim that similar to water which always finds its way, criminals also 
find new ways to escape anti money laundering regulation. Zdanowicz (2004b) sees trade as one 
important ‘backdoor’ for launderers, who can use fake invoicing of exports and imports and other 
forms of trade-based money laundering (TBML) to disguise illicit money flows. According to 
Zdanowicz, these new forms of abusing trade for laundering have not yet been addressed properly by 
the regulatory authorities. 
 
TBML is a relatively unknown form of crime that is used to let illicit money pass borders unnoticed. 
The Financial Action Task Force (2006) ‘concludes that trade-based money laundering represents an 
important channel of criminal activity and, given the growth of world trade, an increasingly important 
money laundering and terrorist financing vulnerability. Moreover, as the standards applied to other 
money laundering techniques become increasingly effective, the use of trade-based money laundering 
can be expected to become increasingly attractive’. As it is a quite recently discovered form of crime, 
not much research on TBML is yet available. Zdanowicz (2004a) estimates the amount of trade-related 
dirty money flows to and from the largest trading country in the world, the US to amount to about one 
fifth of US trade. He has created the only available dataset revealing an indication of the volume of 
this type of criminal activity.
1 To illustrate the dataset of Zdanowicz, Table 1 shows the top 10 
countries in terms of incoming and outgoing TBML, in absolute and relative size. 
 
Baker (2005) makes clear that laundering is not only a US concern, but especially detrimental for 
developing countries. According to his findings for every dollar sent to developing countries for 
                                                
1 Lately, his method also has been applied by the Joint Research Center of the European Commission in Italy, to 
study TBML in Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, but the results have not been published. Detailed data for 
individual Dutch transactions, similar to those of Zdanowicz, are not passed on for scientific research, because 
the Dutch customs claims that they would violate privacy protected under the Dutch Law.   3 
 
development aid, ten dollars flow back to developed countries in the form of money laundering and 
illicit capital flight. That trade can enhance poverty in developing countries is an issue heavily 
discussed in the literature (e.g. Bené et al., 2010). Still lacking in this debate is the extent to which 
trade can be abused by criminals and tax evaders for money laundering purposes. 
 
Table 1. Top 10 countries with trade-based money laundering from and to the US, in absolute  
and relative terms (2004) 
  TBML out of US     TBML into US     TBML out of US     TBML into US  
  in billions of US dollars        as percentage of trade     
1  Canada  18.3    Japan  25.6    Azerbaijan  269    Barbados  26 
2  Japan  14.1  Germany  25.5  Serbia & Montenegro  72  San Marino  25 
3  China  13.8  Canada  21.6  Iran  70  Italy  24 
4  Mexico  13.0  China  20.3  Cuba  62  Germany  23 
5  Germany  11.8  UK  16.2  Kazakhstan  35  Monaco  23 
6  UK  10.1  Mexico  14.7  Bulgaria  34  Switzerland  23 
7  S Korea  7.2  France  9.6  Estonia  32  UK  20 
8  France  5.5  Italy  9.4  Denmark  31  Austria  19 
9  Taiwan  4.8  S Korea  7.7  Barbados  26  France  18 
10  Singapore  4.3  Taiwan  6.4  Philippines  24  Portugal  17 
Source: dataset of Zdanowicz. The two lists in the left-hand panel show that the major trading partners of the US also have 
the most TBML with the US, but the two lists on the right hand reveal that in the rankings in relative terms other countries 
show up. The exports to Azerbaijan are so much undervalued, that the illegal money flow outnumbers the total trade data 
reported by a factor 2.7. Barbados is the only country that shows up in the top 10 of both outgoing and incoming TBML 
countries (measured as percentage of trade).  
 
Since the introduction of anti-money laundering policy, high demand exists for estimates of money 
laundering to justify the burden that is put on public and private entities in charge of chasing dirty 
money. Walker (1995), Schneider (2008), Unger (2007), and Bagella et al. (2009) estimate the amount 
of money laundering based on an economic or econometric model. Walker (1995) was the first to 
propose a prototype model to estimate money laundering worldwide. His so-called Walker model is 
based on the well-known gravity model, which is quite popular in trade economics (Walker and Unger, 
2009; Brakman and Van Bergeijk, 2010). This gravity-style model describes the geographical 
allocation of proceeds of crime, which need to be laundered to cover their criminal origin. The share of 
proceeds transferred from country A to country B depends on the ’attractiveness’ of country B and the 
distance between the two countries. Unger (2007) revived the model for the Netherlands, by updating 
it and refining the distance indicator. However, due to lack of observations of money laundering, the 
weights or parameters of the attractiveness factors in Walker’s model were never based on statistical 
estimates, but only plugged in with values of an inspirational guess. Although the outcome of the 
prototype model seems reliable when compared with other estimations (Walker and Unger, 2009), the 
actual specification of the model was never tested. So, the question that is still open is whether a 
gravity type equation can properly explain bilateral money laundering flows.  
 
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the traditional gravity model and explains 
how variants on this model are used to estimate world-wide money laundering flows. Section 3   4 
 
describes Zdanowicz’s dataset on TBML, investigates the relationship between these TBML flows and 
licit trade and introduces the variables used in the literature to predict money laundering. Section 4 
tests the relevance of the prototype models of Walker and Unger for TBML. Section 5 presents a 
traditional gravity model to explain TBML. The final section draws conclusions. 
 
2. The traditional gravity model  
 
For over decades the gravity model has been successfully applied to flows of the most widely varying 
types, such as migration, buyers distributed across shopping centers, recreational traffic, commuting, 
patient flows to hospitals and interregional as well as international trade. The model is inspired by 
Newton’s universal law of gravity, which states that the attraction between two objects depends on the 
mass of these objects and (the inverse of) their squared mutual distance, apart from a constant. The 
model specifies that a flow from origin i to destination j is determined by supply conditions at the 
origin, by demand conditions at the destination and by stimulating or restraining forces relating to the 
specific flow between i and j. In a context of international trade the traditional gravity model usually 
has the following form:  
 
6 5 4 3 2 1
, , 0 ,
β β β β β β β j i j i j j i i j i P D N Y N Y X =   (1) 
 
where Xi,j is the value of trade between countries i and j, Yk is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 
country k, Nk is the size of the population of country k, and Di,j and Pi,j denote the distance between 
countries i and j and a possible special preference relationship, respectively. The gravity model of 
bilateral trade has become the workhorse of applied international economics (Eichengreen and Irwin, 
1998) and has been used in any number of contexts.
2 Some authors assume that the size of the 




The empirical results obtained with the model have always been judged as very good. Deardorff 
(1998) argues that the model is sensible, intuitive and hard to avoid as a reduced theoretical model to 
explain bilateral trade. Yet the gravity model has some imperfections. One is the absence of a cogent 
derivation of the model, based on economic theory. Several authors have tried to provide the model 
with such a theoretical basis, using models of imperfect competition and product differentiation, 
notably Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985), Helpman and Krugman (1985), Bikker (1987, 2010), 
and Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), whereas Deardorff (1998) proves that the model is also 
consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory under perfect competition. None of these derivations 
                                                
2 Linders (2006) finds 200 studies (actually a sample from a much larger set), and provides a selection in his 
Table 3.1. For an overview, see Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004). 
3 E.g. Tinbergen (1962), Pöyhönen (1963a, 1963b), Pulliainen (1963), and Bergstrand (1985).   5 
 
generate the gravity model exactly as formulated in Equation (1).
4 This equation could only be 
approximated under a number of restrictive and unrealistic assumptions, as has been made clear by 
Bergstrand (1985). This is due to the absence of substitution in the basic gravity model of Equation 
(1). Substitution can be made plausible by an example from economic integration: the accession of 
Estonia to the European Union (EU) in 2004 has led to additional imports by other EU countries of 
wood, wood products and paper (the major export products of Estonia) – that is, gross trade creation. 
However, EU imports of wood products from other countries declined. This decline – trade diversion – 
is not described by the basic gravity model. Bergstrand (1985), Bikker (1987, 2010), Anderson and 
Van Wincoop (2003) and Redding and Scott (2003) extend the basic model with a substitution 
structure.  
 
As TBML is closely related to trade flows, this paper will use the successful basic gravity model – 
Equation (1), extended with additional explanatory variables – for TBML flows stemming from the 
US. 
 
2.1. A gravity model for money laundering 
 
In earlier years, Walker (1995) already recognizes that the gravity model may be useful in order to 
explain laundered money flows between countries. His prototype model for money laundering 
assumes that the share of proceeds from crime generated in country i and sent to country j depends on 
both the mass and ‘attractiveness’ of country j, and the distance between the two countries:  
 
2
, , (( )* ) (Distance) ij i j j j j i j i F F GNP Population Attractiveness = ∑   (2) 
 
Fij is the amount of money laundering flowing from country i to country j. In this model, the flows are 
expressed into shares of countries j in the total outflows of country i (by dividing the flows by ΣiFij, 
the total amount of money to be laundered in country i). If we compare this equation to Equation (1), 
we see that Mass of j is represented by GNPj/Populationj×Attractivenessj and Mass of i by ΣiFij.
5 By 
the way, the interpretation of Equation (2) as gravity model is not from Walker himself but from 
Unger (2007). The first mass factor is per capita income, based on Gross National Product (GNP). The 
second is attractiveness, which is put forward as the sum of a number of weighted factors contributing 
to the quality of country j for money laundering:  
 
3 3 j j j j j Attractiveness BS GA Swift CF = + + − 15 j CR − +
 
                                                
4 The most restrictive theoretical model of Anderson, Bergstrand, as well as Helpman and Krugman, is a gravity 
model with only GDPs as determinants. A less restrictive model has a different functional form (Anderson, 
Equation (16) or additional determinants (Bergstrand, Equation (14)). 
5 Note that Mass of i is not exactly equal to ΣiFij.   6 
 
 
where BS is banking secrecy and GA government attitude, Swift indicates countries with financial 
institutions that are member of Swift, CF refers to conflict and CR stands for corruption.
6 This 
equation became well known in the money laundering field as the Walker equation and has been used 
to estimate money laundering flows (see e.g. Walker, 1995, and Walker, 1999). The underlying idea is 
that since the gravity model can predict trade flows and many other flows so well, it may also be able 
to predict money laundering flows. Fundamental critiques on Walker’s model concern its ad hoc 
nature and the fact that it is not empirically testable, in fact because data on money laundering flows 
Fij are lacking.  
 
Unger (2007) modifies the Walker equation by using the distance between the countries in the 
attractiveness factor, instead of its square. Empirical findings are that most gravity equations for trade 
come up with an estimate of around -0.9 (Helliwell, 2000). Unger (2007) also redefines physical 
distance by including three ‘cultural’ factors: sharing a common language, having colonial ties or 
being major trading partners of each other. Moreover, in the attractiveness index she includes the 
‘membership of the Egmont group’, a cooperation of national Financial Intelligence Units fighting 
money laundering, and ‘financial sector size’ (measured as deposits), as proxies for the fact that 
extended financial markets make it easier to launder criminal proceeds.
7  
 
3. The data 
 
In order to apply the gravity model to TBML flows, we use data for 199 countries, stemming from 
four different sources. The first dataset is from CEPII (www.cepii.fr), a French research center in 
international economics, which provides a database with determinants for gravity equations of trade 
flows. These variables are Border dummy (with value one when two countries share a border), 
Common language dummy (one when two countries have the same language), Colony dummy (one 
when one of the two countries was a colony of the other) and Distance (measured in kilometers ‘as the 
crow flies’ between the countries’ economically most important cities). The second database on 
factors determining money laundering has been collected by John Walker for the estimation of his 
model (Walker, 1999). The attractiveness variables are Corruption (a simplified scale based on the 
Transparency international index of 1996, meaning that countries with a low score have a low 
                                                
6 Note that corruption has a negative impact on laundering. Walker assumes that criminals do not like 
(excessively) corrupt countries, because corruption increases costs of laundering due to necessary side payments 
and bribes. On the other hand, a very low corruption level might make it difficult to find facilitators for 
laundering, increasing the transaction costs of laundering. The corruption–laundering literature is ambiguous 
about the sign. Chaikin and Sharman (2009) give an overview over the various theoretical links between 
corruption and money laundering. Dreher and Schneider (2010) find this ambiguity for the shadow economy also 
empirically: corruption reduces the shadow economy in high-income countries, but increases it in low-income 
countries. 
7 Further, she replaces GNP by GDP.   7 
 
corruption level), Swift member (a dummy variable with 1 for countries with financial institutions that 
are member ), Government attitude (a score for the attitude of a government towards money 
laundering, going up with tolerance), Conflict (a score for a country’s conflict status, with 1 for peace 
and 4 for a heavy conflict) and Bank secrecy (the score goes up with secrecy).
8 Tables A.1-2 in 
Appendix 1 provide greater detail. 
 
We also use the variables defined and described in Unger (2007). New attractiveness variables are 
Egmont Group, a dummy with value 1 for members, and Financial sector size, which measures the 
relative size of the financial sector as Financial Deposits (demand, time and saving deposits) as a share 
of GDP. Moreover, she replaces the physical distance for a measure of cultural and physical distance.
9 
The other variables are roughly identical to those of Walker. Roughly, because the data have been 
constructed and for some variables scaled slightly differently, see Table A.2 for details.
10 The last 
dataset consists of the 2004 estimates on TBML flows from the US by Zdanowicz. His dataset also 
provides the trade data (imports and exports) for the US in millions of dollars.
11  
 
3.1. Identifying trade-based money laundering 
Zdanowicz (2009b) has scrutinized the US Merchandise trade database for suspicious transactions. It 
contains all import and export transactions data of the US with the rest of the world starting in 2004. 
He uses ten-digit product codes,
12 hence very detailed product specifications, and assumes that 
international trade transactions involving abnormally high or low prices, indicate money laundering
13 
(for the thresholds, see Zdanowicz, 2009b). Examples are bottles of ketchup for 50 dollars, a football 
for 3000 dollars, and a Gucci watch worth US$ 100,000 dollar noted as a US$ 50 Swatch on the 
import bill. Table 2 presents aggregated estimates of TBML by origin.  
 
In 2004, an amount of US$ 175 billion entered the US by means of undervalued imports, see Table 2. 
In that case, profits are generated in the US (that is, white money has been created) by selling 
                                                
8 The first two variables are from public sources, while the last three variables are from an unpublished report on 
potential international security threats to Australia, provided by the Australian Office of Strategic Crime 
Assessments.  
9 For a description of how this cultural and physical distance is constructed, see Unger (2007), page 78. 
10 We use Walker’s definitions for the test of his model and for our traditional gravity and Unger’s definitions for 
the test of her model. 
11 Tables A.1-2 in Appendix 1 provides descriptive statistics of these variables. 
12 Transactions are classified under approximately 8,000 different products. Every item that is exported is 
assigned a unique 10-digit identification code. The Harmonization Code System (HS-Code) is a system of 
progressively more specific identifiers for a commodity. For example, concentrated frozen apple juice is 
assigned a 10-digit identifier. This number is an aggregate of a series of codes starting with a broad category 
assigned a 2-digit identifier described as Preparations of Vegetables, Fruit, Nuts, etc. It is then assigned a 4-digit 
identifier described as fruit juices and vegetable juices, etc. The 6-digit identifier is described as apple juice. 
Information from http://exim.indiamart.com/product-classification/ on May 9, 2011 
13 These abnormal prices can also indicate typographical errors or transfer pricing by multinational firms. The 
typographical errors will not affect our results as long as they are randomly distributed, since we correct for the 
size of trade in our final estimation model. Illegal transfer pricing may be included in the TBML estimates of 
Zdanowicz.   8 
 
expensive but fraudulently low-priced imported goods in the US. US$ 48 billion flew into the US by 
means of overvalued exports. In that case, profits are generated in the US by selling cheap but fakely 
high-priced US goods to foreign clients. US$ 56 billion left the US by means of overvalued imports 
and 112 billion dollar by undervalued exports. In these cases profits are similarly generated outside the 
US, respectively by importing overvalued goods and exporting undervalued goods. In total TBML 
amounts to 391 billion US$, or 17 percent of total US trade with other countries in 2004.  
 
Table 2. Trade-based money laundering estimates from Zdanowicz by origin in 2004 (billion  
US$) 
  Imports into the US   Exports from the US   Combination 
Undervalued  175 TBML into US  112 TBML out of US  Swap type 1 
Overvalued  56 TBML out of US  48 TBML into US  Swap type 2 
Source: own calculation based on Zdanowicz (2004a).  
 
TBML flows may also be symmetric. Two partners in crime who both want to launder their criminal 
money, may set up a TBML swap, see the first row of Table 2. They sent undervalued trading goods to 
each other, both incurring effort and cost but also obtaining laundered money. An additional advantage 
may be that they both have profits as well as (tax-deductible) losses, so that they can avoid tax levies 
on their ‘white’ profits. An alternative swap consists of exchanging overvalued goods (swap type 2 in 
Table 2). This swap is even less bothersome as no need exists to sell (undervalued) goods and the 
overvalued goods may be disposed. Since these swaps do not transfer money internationally, they are 
less suited for sending terrorist money. Swaps may also be executed within one country. For 
international remittance of funds a single TBML transaction will do, or a (cross) diagonal combination 
of transactions in Table 2. 
 
3.2. Relationship between licit trade flows and TBML 
Our TBML dataset allows us to investigate the relationship between licit trade flows and TBML. We 
refer to licit trade when we consider trade as reported in the usual trade statistics. Of course, these 
flows are polluted by TBML where that occurs. The basic question here is whether TBML is more or 
less proportional to trade flows, or whether it is distinct from licit trade. We use the Lorenz curve, 
manifoldly used to measure income inequality, to visualize the relationship between trade and TBML. 
The calculations behind the Lorenz curves are explained in Appendix 2.  
 
The diagonal in the Lorenz curve diagram reflects TBML which is strictly proportional to licit trade, 
which is the case if the respective ratios are unity. The values for the ratios determine the positions in 
the Lorenz curve diagrams: countries with a value below 1 will be located on the bottom-left hand. If 
the ratio is 1, the country will be at the point of the Lorenz curve where it runs parallel with the 
diagonal (so with a slope of 1). Finally, countries with ratios higher than 1 will be located on the 
upper-right hand corner. Figure 1 (first panel) ranks countries according to the ratio of their share of    9 
 
Graph 1. Lorentz curves of trade-based money laundering versus US imports and exports (2004) 
1. Lorenz curve of TBML out of US through 
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2. Lorenz curve of TBML out of US through 






















































3. Lorenz curve of TBML into US through 

























































4. Lorenz curve of TBML into US through 
























































Source: Own calculation based on Zdanowicz (2004a).  
 
undervalued exports divided by their share of total exports. The horizontal axis measures the 
cumulative share of exports, while the vertical axis measures the cumulative share of TBML by means 
of undervalued exports. Canada with a share of 23 percent in US exports and a 9.9 percent share of 
total US TBML outflow through undervalued exports has a ratio of 0.43, hence relatively little TBML.   10 
 
Japan and Italy take intermediate positions. At the upper-far right end we find the Philippines, with a 
ratio of 3.52, and Denmark (not shown) with a ratio of 4.95 (see also Table A.5 in Appendix 1). 
 
The Lorenz curves show that UK, Germany, France, Italy and also Malaysia always have 
overproportional shares, while Canada and Mexico always have underproportional shares of trade-
based money laundering. Other countries have sometimes over proportional and sometimes 
underproportional shares. The overall picture that emerges is that TBML flows seem to be strongly 
related to trade flows. This is shown by the rather ‘flat bellies’ of all the Lorenz curves. What we see is 
that the actual Lorenz curves, especially for overvalued imports (Figure 2, upper right panel) and 
overvalued exports (Figure 4, lower right panel), are very close to the diagonal. To conclude, this 
result suggests that overall trade and TBML are strongly related. Given the absence of clear theoretical 
principles explaining TBML flows and the fact that in the past licit trade flows have been successfully 
explained by gravity models, the next sections will investigate the explanatory power of the gravity 
model for TBML. If we go into greater detail, we observe that countries with a dubious reputation 
such as Barbados, Liberia, Monaco, Philippines and Switzerland have overproportional TBML by a 
factor of at least three, indicating that TBML is not just a ‘normal’ part of licit trade (see Table A.5, 
the FATF black list and the OECD grey list). 
 
4. Testing the Walker model for TBML 
 
We apply the prototype model proposed by Walker (1995) on TBML to test whether his specification 
is supported by our data. Therefore, we replace in Equation (2) the share of country j for money 









1 2 3 4 5 6 ( / )*( )
n
ij ij j j j j j j j ij
j
TBML TBML GDP Population BS GA Swift CF CR D
β β β β β β β = + + + + + ∑
  (3) 
 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of Equation (3). Since the model is nonlinear in its parameters, 
we use the Nonlinear Least Squares (NLS) estimation procedure. Starting values for the model 
parameters, as required in the NLS’s iterative numerical estimation procedure, stem from Walker 
                                                
14 Note that our application of this Walker model differs from the standard gravity model for trade in the sense 
that we have data of flows to or from the US only, while normally flows from many origin countries to many 
destination countries are considered. Since in the Walker model only the characteristics of the destination 
country j matter, we use only the flows of TBML from the US to all other countries in the world. We cannot use 
the TBML flows to the US, because these flows all have the same destination country j (the US) and therefore 
have no variation in the model of Equation 3.   11 
 
(1995). Column 1 gives the initial Walker values, while Column 2 gives the estimated NLS 
coefficients, which differ greatly from the Walker values for money laundering, where, for some 
variables, even the sign changed. The only coefficient that is significantly different from zero is the 
distance coefficient. With an estimated value of 0.614 (significant at the 1% level), this coefficient is 
however not close to the value of 2, as suggested by Walker (and as in Newton’s gravity law). The 
model is able to explain 43% of the variation in the share of total TBML across countries.
15 
 
Table 3. Testing the Walker (1995) model using estimates of trade-based money laundering  
flows out of the US (2004) 
  Walker’s 
values for ML 
NLS estimates of Equation (3) for TBML 





H0: βi = αi 
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Bank secrecy  3  -0.022  0.015  -1.51  -201.47 
Government attitude  1  -0.037  0.024  -1.52  -43.21 
Swift membership  1  0.072  0.077  0.95  -12.05 
Conflict level  -3  0.110  0.090  1.23  34.56 
Corruption level  -1  -0.015  0.013  -1.20  75.77 
Distance to US  2  ***0.614  0.079  7.78  -17.54 
Constant  15  0.052  0.074  0.71  -202 
Nr. of observations    199       
Adjusted R
2    42.7       
Note: 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
To test whether the estimates differ significantly from the suggested values in Walker (1995), we 
assume that the errors are distributed normally and use the coefficient standard errors in Column 3 to 
compute t-values of the estimates in Column 5. Column 5 tests for each model variable the null 
hypothesis that the true beta coefficient is equal to the Walker values (denoted by αi). For each of the 
model parameters, we reject the Walker value. We conclude here the Walker (1995) model is unable 




4.1. Testing the modified Walker model of Unger 
 
As a next step we use our dataset to evaluate the modified Walker model for money laundering 
suggested by Unger (2007), which includes cultural factors for the constructed measure of cultural and 
physical distance (CPD) and two more variables for the attractiveness: size of the financial sector and 
Membership of the Egmont group. The equation that will be estimated is specified as: 
                                                
15 A caveat is that Walker specifies his model for money laundering while we test the model using data of only 
one type of money laundering. 
16 Please note that the failure of the Walker model to explain TBML well could come from the fact that the 
parameters of the Walker model have never been tested but resulted from an inspirational guess or because 
money laundering in general is explained significantly differently than TBML.   12 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 ( / )*(
n
ij ij j j j j j j j
j
TBML TBML GDP Population BS GA Swift CF CR β β β β β = + + + + ∑    
9
6 7 8) j j ij Egmont FD CPD
β β β β + + +   (4) 
 
Table 4 presents the estimates of Equation (4). The parameter values in Column 1 are suggested by 
Unger (2007). Table 4 shows that – similar to the testing of the Walker specification – all coefficients 
are insignificant, except the coefficient of the cultural and physical distance (2.85), which is 
significantly at the 1% level. Column 5 presents the t-test values on the null hypothesis that the Unger 
parameter values are ‘true’. The results make clear that all variables are significantly different from 
what is suggested by Unger (2007). We conclude that we hardly find any empirical underpinning for 
the prototype models of Walker (1995) and Unger (2007), except that one of the key variables of the 
gravity model – distance – is apparently essential. 
 
Table 4. Testing the modified Walker model of Unger (2007) applied to trade-based money  
laundering (2004) 
  Unger’s values 
for ML 
NLS estimates of Equation (4) for TBML 





H0: βi = αi 
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Bank secrecy  3  -0.056  0.039  -1.45  -78.36 
Government attitude  1  -0.082  0.054  -1.51  -20.04 
Swift membership  1  0.014  0.117  0.12  -8.43 
Conflict level  -3  0.021  0.019  1.10  159.00 
Corruption level  -1  0.023  0.025  0.92  40.92 
Egmont group  1  0.074  0.065  1.14  -14.25 
Financial deposits  1  -0.002  0.009  -0.28  -111.33 
Physical and cultural distance  1  ***2.848  0.327  8.71  5.66 
Constant  10  0.161  0.147  1.09  -66.93 
Nr. of observations    199       
Adjusted R
2    42.8       
Note: 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
 
5. A gravity model for trade-based money laundering 
 
Since the Walker model and the adjusted Walker model do not seem to explain TBML well, we use a 
standard gravity model –see Equation (1) – expanded by the variables used in the attractiveness 
indicators of the (adjusted) Walker model to explain TBML.
17 This model has a straightforward 
                                                
17 Our dataset consists of estimations of TBML from the US to the rest of the world only, while normal gravity 
models use data of flows between all origins and destinations. To show that it is possible to estimate a gravity 
equation with data on only a part of the flows, we estimated a standard gravity equation for trade with our dataset 
in Appendix 3.    13 
 
loglinear nature instead of the combination of additive and multiplicative variables as in the prototype 
models of Walker and Unger. 
 
Table 5. Trade-based money laundering gravity model for US outflow (2004) 
  Gravity model for TBML   Best fit model (AIC) 
  Structural model  Reduced form model  Structural model 
  Coeff.  St. dev.  Coeff.  St. dev.  Coeff.  St. dev. 
Trade  ***1.02  0.09      ***1.03  0.09 
GDP  *0.22  0.18  ***0.85  0.28  **0.14  0.07 
Population  -0.05  0.10  0.06  0.24     
Border dummy  ***-2.60  0.64  -0.13  1.61  ***-2.53  0.57 
Common language  0.33  0.35  0.42  0.53     
Colonial background  -0.20  0.61  0.66  1.14     
Swift membership  -0.15  1.20  0.00  1.69     
Egmont membership  0.48  0.33  **1.42  0.59  **0.59  0.28 
Financial deposits  -0.05  0.32  *1.05  0.63     
Corruption level  0.20  0.28  -0.14  0.57     
Bank secrecy  0.11  0.19  0.40  0.39     
Government attitude  *-0.44  0.25  -0.64  0.50  **-0.39  0.19 
Conflict  *0.31  0.19  0.24  0.31  0.29  0.19 
Distance  *-0.34  0.19  ***-1.10  0.31  ***-0.34  0.14 
Constant  **-5.26  2.24  5.42  4.53  **-3.88  1.54 
Nr. of observations  199    199    199   
Adjusted R
2  88.2    66.9    88.5   
Notes: 
*, **, *** indicates significance at, respectively, the 10%, 5% and 1% level. All variables are expressed in logs.
18  
 
Table 5 presents the results of the gravity model for TBML flows. One of the driving factors of TBML 
is licit trade itself: the larger the trade flow, the larger opportunities for fraud. Therefore, in the TBML 
model at the left-hand side of Table 5 trade has been added as explanatory variable. We call this the 
‘structural model’, as it explains the impact of trade separately from the other explanatory variables. 
The next paragraph will discuss the ‘reduced form model’. We consider this to be the best 
specification of a TBML gravity equation, which, apart from the different functional form, is in fact a 
slight extension of the modified Walker model: we add trade and a border dummy as explanatory 
factors. Estimation results confirm that trade is an important determinant of TBML, as its coefficient is 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of around 1 indicates proportionality between trade en 
TBML, in line with the Lorentz curve analysis in Section 3.2. Except for trade and the border dummy 
(which in this case is basically a dummy for US trade with Canada and Mexico), many independent 
variables are insignificant or only significant at the 10% level. Therefore, we use Akaike’s Information 
Criterion (AIC) to search for the best fit model specification. The model with the lowest AIC is 
presented at the right hand side of Table 5. The AIC indicates to drop Population, Common Language, 
Colonial Background, Swift membership, Financial deposits, Corruption level and Bank secrecy. In 
this leaner specification, GDP, Egmont Membership, Government Attitude and Distance become 
significant at a 5% level. TBML flows can best be explained by GDP (which represents the mass of 
                                                
18 Note that we use only one variable for categorical variables (as explained in Table A.2 in Appendix 1), instead 
of a dummy for each category. Using a dummy for each category does not alter the results significantly.   14 
 
the countries), trade (which represents the mass of the flow in which TBML is hidden), distance (as is 
standard in gravity models, corrected for border countries) and two anti-money laundering policy 
variables (Egmont-membership and Government attitude). Surprisingly, the two anti-money 
laundering policy variables have the opposite sign of what was expected by Walker (1995) and Unger 
(2007). Membership of Egmont, i.e. a cooperation agreement between countries to fight money 
laundering together, leads to more TBML and countries with a government that have a hostile attitude 
towards money laundering have more TBML than those with a more tolerant attitude. These relations 
can probably best be explained by the fact that TBML has been discovered quite recently, while the 
anti-money laundering policies at the moment are targeted almost completely on the traditional form 
of money laundering in the financial system. Our results suggest that money launderers use TBML as 
an alternative for traditional money laundering when the country they send their money to is fighting 
(the traditional form of) money laundering intensively. An alternative explanation is that countries 
which face more money laundering are more eager to undertake adequate actions to combat it. 
 
Finally, the middle panel of Table 5 presents the estimation results of the ‘reduced form model’. Here, 
the underlying classical gravity model for international trade – with GDP, Population and Distance as 
its main determinants – is as if substituted in the ‘structural model’. As a result, TBML is explained 
directly from the traditional gravity variables GDP, Population and Distance as well as the typical 
money laundering variables. As common in trade models the GDP coefficient does not differ 
significantly from 1 and the distance measure coefficient does not deviate significantly from -1. 
Remarkably, in this specification, the Egmont membership coefficient is significantly at the 5% level, 
while the Financial deposits coefficient is significantly at the 10% level. However, the goodness-of-fit 
measure (adjusted R
2) makes clear that this reduced form model is inferior to the structural model 




6. Conclusion  
 
Combating money laundering is important for society. However, an evaluation of the effects of anti 
money laundering policies is hampered by an enormous lack of data. That has motivated Walker and 
Unger to propose a prototype model for money laundering which has characteristics of the traditional 
gravity model. The model parameters were based on guess estimates. We use a dataset of Zdanowicz 
on trade-based-money laundering and find that TBML is indeed much more frequent in relative terms 
in US trade with countries which have a dubious status in terms of money laundering. With this 
dataset, we are able to test the Walker and Unger prototype models for money laundering when 
                                                
19 In the reduced form model only the model value of trade (exclusively of the residual or error term) while in the 
structural model the complete value (including the error term) is used.   15 
 
applied to TBML. Our conclusion is that these models perform badly for this subset of money 
laundering. We replace the functional form of the Walker model, which is a mix of linear and 
multiplicative variables, by a multiplicative standard gravity equation as frequently used for trade 
flows, and extend this model with explanatory variables from the Walker and Unger models. We are 
then able to explain the distribution of TBML between 199 countries and the US in a satisfactory 
manner. TBML appears to be highly related to licit trade, which permits this kind of money laundering 
to go unnoticed, as illicit proceeds hide in the large pool of licit exports and imports. Other 
explanatory variables are distance between the respective two countries, correction for bordered 
countries, GDP of the importing country, and whether the importing country fights money laundering. 
The latter is measured by membership of Egmont, i.e. a multilateral cooperation agreement to fight 
money laundering together, and by the attitude of the importing country towards money laundering. 
Hence, we can apply the traditional intuition of a gravity model – that is, explain a flow by two masses 
and the mutual distance – to TBML. One might expect that governments which agree to fight money 
laundering (through their Egmont Membership) and have a hostile attitude towards money laundering 
experience less TBML. However, our results suggest the opposite: countries, which have strict anti-
money laundering regulation, experience more trade related money laundering. This may indicate that 
criminals have discovered a new way of laundering by using TBML to escape stricter anti-money 
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Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics and greater details of trade-based money laundering data  
 
Table A.1 Descriptive statistics of trade, TBML and explanatory variables of 200 countries  
(2004) 
  Unit  Mean  Sd  Median  Nr 
a  Min  Max  Skewness  Kurtosis 
Total TBML   US$, logs  17.65  3.41  17.64  200  8.33  24.41  -0.16  2.52 
TBML into the US   US$, logs  16.72  3.50  16.61  199  6.68  23.97  -0.08  2.65 
TBML out of the US   US$, logs  17.00  3.40  17.27  200  7.41  23.63  -0.19  2.36 
Trade   million US$, logs  6.39  2.68  6.16  200  -2.32  13.00  0.04  2.76 
GDP per capita   million US$, logs  9.85  2.57  10.02  199  -1.35  15.69  -0.52  3.96 
Financial system deposits   share of GDP, 
logs 
0.29  0.30  0.23  199  0.00  2.17  1.89  10.09 
Distance to US   km  8.92  0.55  9.02  200  6.31  9.69  -1.20  4.93 
Corruption index (Walker)    3.83  0.98  4.00  200  1.00  4.93  -1.15  3.69 
a Nr stands for number of observations. 
 
Table A.2 Descriptive statistics of the attractiveness term by Walker and Unger 
Walker data variables  Nr 
a  Unger data variables  Nr 
a 
Bank secrecy equals 1(no bank secrecy)  134  Bank secrecy equals 1 (no bank secrecy laws)  103 
Bank secrecy equals 2  21  Bank secrecy equals 2  46 
Bank secrecy equals 3(strict bank secrecy)  45  Bank secrecy equals 3  14 
    Bank secrecy equals 4 (bank secrecy laws enforced)  36 
Government attitude equals 1 (hostile)  25  Government attitude equals 1 (hostile)  30 
Government attitude equals 2  35  Government attitude equals 2  70 
Government attitude equals 2.5  7  Government attitude equals 3  90 
Government attitude equals 3  60  Government attitude equals 4  4 
Government attitude equals 4 (tolerant)  73  Government attitude equals 5 (tolerant)  5 
No swift membership  45  No swift membership  12 
Swift membership  154  Swift membership  187 
Conflict level equals 1 (peaceful country)  118  Conflict level equals 1 (no conflict)  122 
Conflict level equals 2  49  Conflict level equals 2  29 
Conflict level equals 3  21  Conflict level equals 3  28 
Conflict level equals 4 (heavy conflict)  12  Conflict level equals 4  17 
    Conflict level equals 5 (conflict situation)  3 
    Corruption level equals 1 (low corruption)  17 
    Corruption level equals 2  17 
    Corruption level equals 3  39 
    Corruption level equals 4  120 
    Corruption level equals 5 (high corruption)  6 
    Member of Egmont group  87 
    English is an official language   63 
    Colonial relationship with US  6 
 
a Nr stands for number of observations. 
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Table A.3. Under- and overvaluation of US exports and imports with 25 countries (2004; billion  
US$) 
  UEX  OIM  ML
OUT  UIM  OEX  ML
IN 
Column  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Australia  0.9  0.9  1.8  1.2  1.0  2.2 
Canada  11.0  7.3  18.3  6.5  15.1  21.6 
Denmark  1.5  0.4  1.9  0.1  0.6  0.7 
France  1.3  1.3  2.6  2.2  0.9  3.1 
Germany  6.4  5.4  11.8  2.7  22.8  25.5 
UK  7.6  2.5  10.1  2.9  13.4  16.2 
Italy  1.5  1.5  3.0  0.8  8.6  9.4 
Japan  8.2  6.0  14.1  3.6  22.0  25.6 
Netherlands  2.6  0.5  3.1  2.4  3.1  5.5 
Norway  0.5  0.2  0.8  0.1  0.5  0.6 
Switzerland  2.3  0.7  3.0  0.4  4.3  4.7 
Luxembourg  0.100  0.009  0.108  0.020  0.019  0.039 
Monaco  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.009  0.009 
Lichtenstein  0.000  0.018  0.018  0.001  0.009  0.010 
Barbados  0.099  0.001  0.100  0.014  0.086  0.100 
China  6.0  7.8  13.8  2.6  17.7  20.3 
Malaysia  2.3  1.2  3.5  1.7  3.5  5.2 
Philippines  3.4  0.5  3.9  1.1  0.7  1.8 
Taiwan  3.1  1.7  4.8  2.4  4.1  6.4 
Mexico  8.8  4.2  13.0  5.3  9.4  14.7 
Russia  0.5  0.2  0.7  0.1  0.4  0.5 
Senegal  0.005  0.000  0.005  0.009  0.000  0.009 
Liberia  0.001  0.033  0.034  0.001  0.003  0.004 
Botswana  0.002  0.006  0.007  0.001  0.006  0.007 
Cameroon  0.001  0.024  0.025  0.005  0.001  0.007 
Rest of world  45.8  15.9  61.6  15.5  48.7  64.1 
Total for US  111.6  56.2  167.8  48.1  175.2  223.3 
Note: The variables are undervalued US exports (UEX), overvalued US imports (OIM), their sum (ML
OUT ), overvalued US 
exports (OEX), undervalued US imports (UIM), and their sum (ML
IN). 
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Table A.4. Under- and overvaluation of US ex- and imports as share of total US under- and  
                   overvaluation for 25 countries (2004) 
  uex  oim  ml
out  uim  oex  ml
in  ex  im 
Column  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
Australia  1.6  0.5  1.2  0.6  1.7  0.8  1.7  0.5 
Canada  9.9  12.9  10.9  8.6  13.5  9.7  23.0  17.4 
Denmark  1.3  0.8  1.1  0.4  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3 
France  3.5  2.9  3.3  4.8  2.5  4.3  2.6  2.2 
Germany  5.7  9.7  7.1  13.0  5.6  11.4  3.8  5.3 
UK  6.8  4.4  6.0  7.6  6.0  7.3  4.4  3.2 
Italy  1.4  2.7  1.8  4.9  1.6  4.2  1.3  1.9 
Japan  7.3  10.6  8.4  12.6  7.5  11.5  6.7  8.8 
Netherlands  2.3  0.9  1.8  1.7  5.0  2.5  3.0  0.9 
Norway  0.5  0.4  0.5  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.4 
Switzerland  2.0  1.3  1.8  2.4  0.9  2.1  1.1  0.8 
Luxembourg  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0 
Monaco  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Lichtenstein  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Barbados  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
China  5.4  13.9  8.2  10.1  5.4  9.1  4.3  13.4 
Malaysia  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.0  3.5  2.3  1.3  1.9 
Philippines  3.0  0.9  2.3  0.4  2.3  0.8  0.9  0.6 
Taiwan  2.8  3.0  2.9  2.3  4.9  2.9  2.7  2.4 
Mexico  7.9  7.5  7.7  5.4  10.9  6.6  13.6  10.6 
Russia  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.4  0.8 
Senegal  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Liberia  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Botswana  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Cameroon  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Rest of world  41.0  28.3  36.7  27.8  32.2  28.7  33.0  31.3 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Note: For the variable names in Columns 7-12, see note below Table A.3. Lower cases point to shares. For the last two 
columns: the countries’ shares in US exports (ex) and US imports (im) 
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Table A.5. Ratios of US TBML outflows and licit US exports for 25 countries (2004; billion US$) 
  uexr  oimr  uimr  oexr 
Column  15  16  17  18 
Australia  0.93  0.89  1.17  0,99 
Canada  0.43  0.74  0.50  0.59 
Denmark  4.95  2.92  1.34  0.84 
France  1.34  1.34  2.21  0.95 
Germany  1.49  1.84  2.48  1.45 
UK  1.55  1.40  2.42  1.35 
Italy  1.05  1.39  2.58  1.19 
Japan  1.10  1.21  1.43  1.12 
Netherlands  0.77  1.09  2.04  1.69 
Norway  2.44  0.89  0.69  0.91 
Switzerland  1.80  1.65  3.09  0.77 
Luxembourg  1.03  0.77  0.53  0.49 
Monaco  0.01  0.63  3.45  0.02 
Lichtenstein  0.11  1.65  0.27  1.11 
Barbados  2.09  0.58  19.60  0.67 
China  1.27  1.04  0.76  1.27 
Malaysia  1.56  1.12  1.05  2.63 
Philippines  3.52  1.47  0.67  2.60 
Taiwan  1.04  1.28  0.98  1.86 
Mexico  0.58  0.70  0.51  0.81 
Russia  1.20  0.55  0.30  0.69 
Senegal  0.39  0.10  0.02  1.65 
Liberia  0.10  10.38  0.27  0.35 
Botswana  0.24  2.01  0.66  0.29 
Cameroon  0.05  2.03  0.04  0.94 
Rest of world  1.24  0.90  0.89  0.98 
Explanation: Canada with a 9.9 percent share of total US TBML outflow through undervalued exports and a share of 23 
percent in US exports has a ratio of 0.43. Ratios below 1 indicate relatively little TBML while ratios above 1 reflect relatively 
more TBML. 
 
Appendix 2: The calculations behind the Lorenz curves 
 
The total outflow of TBML from the US consists of the sum of undervalued US exports (denoted by 
UEX) and overvalued US imports (OIM), so ∑ + = n
i i i
OUT OIM UEX ML ) ( , where the subscript i is the 
country index.
20 This total corresponds to the upper-left hand cell in Table 2. Throughout, we use 
absolute values for undervaluation so that TBML is always positive. Analogously, we define 
overvalued US exports (OEX) and undervalued US imports (UIM) and their sum 
total: ∑ + = n
i i i
IN UIM OEX ML ) ( , the bottom-right hand cell in Table 2. Using these variables, Table 
A.3 gives an overview of these TBML values for a selection of 25 out of the 199 countries.  
                                                
20 Absolute amounts are expressed in capitals, percentages are in lower cases, and ratios are also in lower cases 
but ending with letter r. US export to country i is denoted by  i EX  and US imports from country i by  i IM . 
Exports can be overvalued (denoted by  i OEX ) or undervalued ( i UEX ) and the same applies to imports 
( i OIM and  i UIM ), where the over- or undervaluation is measured as the difference in value evaluated against 
the normal price and the actual price.   22 
 
 













and likewise for the other variables (see Table A.4). So, Canada holds a share of 11.0/111.6 = 9.9 
percent in undervalued US exports (Column 7), using the first and bottom rows of column 1 in table 
A.3. Columns 13 and 14 present the countries’ shares in US exports (ex) and US imports (im). They 
show that Canada is the most important export and import partner of the US, followed by Mexico with 
respect to exports and by China with respect to imports.  
 
For our purposes, the most interesting variables are the countries’ shares of under- and overvalued US 
ex- and imports in the US totals relative to the countries’ licit trade shares of ex- and imports in the US 
totals. For example, uexri, or the countries’ shares of undervalued US exports in the US total relative 
to the countries’ licit trade shares of exports in the US total export, is defined as: 
 
1 1 ( ) ( )
n n
i i j i j i i j j uexr UEX UEX EX EX uex ex
= = = = ∑ ∑   (A.1) 
 
If a country’s share of undervalued US exports would exactly be equal to its US export share, then the 
ratio uexri is unity. If it is higher (lower) than proportional, the ratio is higher (lower) than 1. The 
results of these calculations are given in Table A.5 in Appendix 1. Denmark has high ratios for 
undervalued exports and overvalued imports, both contributing to US TBML outflow. Barbados has a 
very high ratio (19.6) of undervalued imports. However, as Column 4 in Table A.3 shows, the 
underlying undervalued US imports from Barbados amount to only $14 million. 
 
Appendix 3: Testing the gravity model for trade 
 
This appendix investigates to what extent it is possible to actually estimate a gravity model on the 
basis of just data flows from one country (the US in our case). Table A.6 tests whether the loglinear 
gravity model for trade, as formulated in Equation (1), yields results similar to the ones in the literature 
if we restrict our trade dataset to the same asymmetric geographical structure as our TBML dataset.  
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Table A.6. A standard gravity model for US exports extended by attractiveness indicators (2004) 
  Basic trade model 
    standard deviation 
GDP  0.98***  0.21 
Population  -0.19  0.19 
Border dummy  2.03*  1.21 
Common language  0.66*  0.39 
Colonial background  0.86**  0.41 
Distance  -0.92***  0.22 
Constant  7.88***  3.02 
Nr. of observations  199   
R
2, adjusted  0.64   
Note: 
 *, ** and
*** indicates significance at, respectively, the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
The results in Table A.6 show that our results are in line with other research, such as Helpman et al. 
(2008).All coefficients have the expected sign and those of GDP, Colonial background and Distance 
are highly significant. The value on the distance coefficient is at -0.92 fully in line with the commonly 
found estimate of around -0.9. This indicates that the standard gravity model applies satisfactorily to 
the restricted, asymmetric dataset. This result leads us to conclude that despite the fact that we use data 
on flows from the US only, coefficients on the most important variables of the gravity model, GDP 
and distance, are in line with other studies.  